1 MPD, p. 102, Russell explains that it was his application of this method of substituting logical constructions for inferred entities to the realm of physics, even with due acknowledgement to Whitehead for suggesting it (ML, p. 157), that "vexed" Whitehead. "In fact, it put an end to our collaboration" (Auto. The relationship between the hypotheses of physics and the broader questions of philosophy were in fact to pre-occupy Russell increasingly from the autumn of 1912 onwards-with results which spread far beyond the purely academic….
[A]s the great bouleversement of traditional physics became apparent with the acceptance of radio-activity, the Quantum Theory and Relativity, Russell became so immersed in symbolic logic that little time was left for thought on other things. Only now, early in the second decade of the twentieth century, did he appreciate how much physics was demanding not laboratory experiment but the mathematical expertise which he understood so well.
one area of traditional philosophy that Russell thought should be excluded from philosophy. Thus, Russell, in exalting the philosophy of Spinoza over that of Locke, resorts to extra-philosophic considerations as criteria for philosophic preference.
ii. the lockean vs. spinozistic theories of knowledge
One of the things that makes Russell a complicated Wgure in the history of philosophy is his reverence for both logical rigour and empiricism. Although Russell retained to his last days a fondness for the a priori that he was never quite able to shake, his epistemology tends to become, as I have argued on another occasion, more empiricist as he aged. It was Russell's view that "The hardest of hard data are of two sorts: the particular facts of sense, and the general truths of logic" (OKEW 2 , p. 78). Which of these two, though, enjoys primacy in his theory of knowledge seems to vary greatly. From the late 1890s to 1910, Russell focused on mathematics. In 1910, he turned his attention from the realm of mathematics to that of the physical world. He credits Alfred North Whitehead with inspiring him to apply Ockham's razor in investigating that of which the physical world truly consists.
1 Starting in 1912, Russell had visions of bringing back "the union of philosophy and science that existed in the 17th century, as well as in Plato and Aristotle".
2 Russell became increasingly fascinated by science. 4 All a priori propositions are necessarily hypothetical, and all knowledge of other things must be derived from empirical data (PP 2 , p. 75). Russell considers it "obvious" that sensory perception provides the sort of "common knowledge" that is "completely self-evident" (OKEW 2 , p. 75).
By the time of A History of Western Philosophy, Russell believed a proper role for logical analysis is to reduce the role of mathematics and to rein in its anti-empiricist tendencies. He demotes mathematical knowledge to the status of "merely verbal knowledge … of the same nature as the 'great truth' that there are three feet in a yard" (HWP, pp. 833, 832). Indeed, for Russell of the 1940s, logic in general, far from enjoying its heyday as the "essence of philosophy" (OKEW, Lec. ii), was relegated to not even being part of philosophy (HK 2 , p. v).
During the 1940s, Locke's empiricism must have been more palatable to Russell than Spinoza's rationalism. Like Russell, Locke had a comparatively clear way of saying that the ultimate nature of reality is unclear. A quotation from Locke's Essay concerning Human Understandingz that is in a very Russellian vein is that "the general propositions that are made about substances, if they are certain, are for the most part but triXing; and if they are instructive, are uncertain…."
5 As Locke sees the matter, it is not feasible for us to ascertain the extent to which substances with which we are acquainted are dependent for their being on causes utterly unknown to us. 6 Although Locke is optimistic about Newton's innovations, 7 he is defeatist about arriving at a "perfect science of natural bodies". physics the two fundamental areas of philosophy. Since the superiority of Spinoza over Locke does not follow as far as theory of knowledge is concerned, it is to metaphysics that we now turn.
iii. locke and spinoza's respective metaphysics
Toward the end of 1898, Russell started rejecting the Hegelian idealist view that everything resides in the mental processes of the beholder, and believed instead in a fuller, Platonic universe replete with numbers, points of space, and universals (MPD, p. 62). However, during the First World War, Russell experienced his "retreat from Pythagoras" in which he rejected mathematics as an "abstract ediWce subsisting in a Platonic heaven and only reaching the world of sense in an impure and degraded form" (ibid.). This was to result for Russell in a metaphysic of materialism, or, more strictly speaking, physicalism.
9
Up to a point, we can appreciate why Russell thought Spinoza a better philosopher than Locke. Although Spinoza is a rationalist, in Principles of Cartesian Philosophy he conWnes reality to the phenomena of nature presented by the senses. 10 And, in Treatise on the Emendation of the Intellect, he takes the position that "it is above all necessary for us always to deduce our ideas from physical things, i.e., from real beings … and in such a manner as never to get involved with abstractions and universals, neither inferring something real from them nor inferring them from something real. For in either case the true progress of the intellect is interrupted."
11
Russell is comparatively consistent throughout his long life about the suspect role of religion in our thinking. Both Locke and Spinoza had more to do with religion than Russell would have thought appropriate. While Locke might be viewed as something of a moderate, Spinoza espouses both the religious and the irreligious at diTerent times. Indeed, when considering Spinoza's views of religion, one detects the presence of two Spinozas: Spinoza the secular, sane pantheist and Spinoza the pseudo-St. Anselm. 12 Spinoza's aforementioned aversion to interrupting the intellect's true progress by making inferences about reality from abstractions and universals does not prevent him from positing essencez as something objective. In the "Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts", he is content with formulations such as "God necessarily exists, for his essence cannot be conceived without existence."
12 That is, "Spinoza surreptitiously objectiWes after the manner of mediaeval Realists, a distinction which is only possible in abstraction, the distinction namely, between essence and existence."
13 He perpetrates the neo-Platonic fallacy that degrees of perfection, here used as denoting "essence", 14 correspond to degrees of reality. 15 Russell, by contrast-at least the post-1919 Russell-will have nothing to do with the objectivity of essences. Rather, "the question of 'essence' is one as to the use of words….
[A] word may have an essence, but a thing cannot" (HWP, pp. 200-1). If this view of Russell's is right, it has unfavourable implications for Spinoza's philosophy. As Spinoza puts it, "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things." 16 For him, this enables the discernment of a nexus between the formal essence of certain attributes of God and the essence of things. Spinoza would never have suspected that, in proceeding from a true, or adequate, idea of the formal essence of certain attributes of God to an adequate knowledge of the essence of things, he was engaged in a merely linguistic process.
In full appreciation of such possible confusion, rather than claiming 17 An Essay concerning the Human Understanding, Book iv, Chap. viii, §9 (p. 524). 18 Ibid.,
anguages, in all countries, have been established long before sciences. So that they have not been philosophers or logicians, or such who have troubled themselves about forms and essences, that have made the general names that are in use amongst the several nations of men: but those more or less comprehensive terms have, for the most part, in all languages, received their birth and signiWcation from ignorant and illiterate people, who sorted and denominated things by those sensible qualities they found in them …" (ibid., Chap. vi, §25 [pp. to have knowledge of "formal essences", Locke took the trouble to note how the universal propositions we can posit with regard to substances are limited to the properties of the nominal essence of the substance in question. 17 In this respect, Locke departs from the Scholastics' view that the structure of objective reality is deducible from the structure of our language. Instead, for Locke, the close connection between words and ideas requires careful consideration of the nature, utility, and meaning of language.
18 For language is fraught with imperfection, and words by their very nature are doomed to obscurity and ambiguity. 19 Locke is aware of the fallacies that can ensue when words are mistaken for things, 20 and he decries the substance/attribute dichotomy as confused and obscure. 21 Our ideas of substance are merely postulates of a vague substratum with qualities generating simple ideas in our minds that are usually termed "accidents".
22 "Our speciWc ideas of substances are nothing else but a collection of a certain number of simple ideas, considered as united in one thing." Of body's "substance," or "substratum," we have "no other idea of it at all". 23 Although Spinoza was more prone than Locke to overestimate the extent to which syntactical structures adumbrate ontological ones, he was less inclined than Locke to project on to the cosmos at large the sort of plans, or designs, characteristic of human behaviour. Thus, as Spinoza sees the matter, we are to equate the "will of God" with the "sanctuary of ignorance". 24 ically oriented structures and operations:
25 "Nature has no Wxed goal and … all Wnal causes are but Wgments of the human imagination." 26 They who attempt to demonstrate that nature does nothing that is not conducive to humanity's well-being show only that "Nature and the gods are as crazy as mankind." 27 With the exception of Spinoza's use of words like "God" to describe nature, the secular, sane pantheist Spinoza says little with which the most ardent materialist would take issue. According to Steven Nadler's Spinoza: a Life, Despite Spinoza's theological language and what look like concessions to orthodox sentiment…, there is no mistaking his intentions. His goal is nothing less than the complete desacrilization and naturalization of religion and its concepts.… Nearly all of Spinoza's critics saw the [Theological-Politicaly] Treatise as a dangerous and subversive work that, under the cover of a nominal belief in God, was intended to spread atheism and libertinism. Even Thomas Hobbes, not one to be squeamish when it came to political and theological controversy, was taken aback by Spinoza's audacity. According to his biographer, the English philosopher claimed that the Treatise "cut through him a bar's length, for he durst not write so boldly."
28
For prudential reasons, however, Spinoza expressly dissociates himself from atheism on the bizarre grounds that atheists are addicted to the sort of honours and riches he had always held in contempt. 2), in spite of the facts that he identiWes God with nature and encourages us to restrict what we understand as reality to the phenomena of Nature presented by the senses. 34 Locke's Essay mentions belief in life and death only to consign it to those tenets that are "purely matters of faith, with which reason has directly nothing to do" (Book iv, Chap. xviii, §7 [p. 587]). This is noteworthy because Locke also took the position that "he that takes away reason to make way for revelation, puts out the light of both" (Book iv, Chap. xix, §4 [p. 591]). And it was most likely this latter sentiment that prompted Leibniz to remark "Mr. Locke and his followers are uncertain at least whether the soul be not material and naturally perishable" ("The Controversy between Leibniz On the subject of a philosophical basis for belief in immortality, the silence of Locke's Essayz is deafening. 34 The same cannot be said so simply concerning Spinoza. Kenneth Blackwell, in The Spinozistic Ethics of Bertrand Russell, will have us understand that "Russell's interpretation of Spinoza's notion of immortality … is bound up with the transcendence or enlargement of self." 35 However, Spinoza's manner of speaking seems to have metaphysical and not just ethical implications.
In the Principles of Cartesian Philosophy's "Appendix Containing Metaphysical Thoughts", Spinoza states that nature's laws require us to believe in the human mind's immortality because of the indestructibility of substance.
36 Unless Spinoza has in mind nothing more than the eternity of the universe, the immortality of individual souls seems a particularly odd tenet for a thinker to adopt who denies the apparent plurality of substances 37 and our ability to even conceive of a substance independent of God.
38
The situation is hardly helped by Spinoza's bizarre equation of a mind conceiving something "under a form" of eternity with a mind being eternal. 39 Nadler explains: "Spinoza basically denies that the human soul is immortal in the sense of enjoying a life after death. Although he is will- 46 Letter 30. In the conclusion to Letter 6, Spinoza explains his hesitation in publishing Short Treatise on God, Man, and His Well-Being because of his fear that "the theologians of our time may take oTence, and, with their customary spleen, may attack me, who utterly dread brawling" (p. 776). It is also known that the criticisms from both theologians and Cartesians were the reason for Spinoza's decision against publishing his Ethics and that the "political and ecclesiastical persecution of the time" led his friends to delete ing to grant that the mind (or part of it) is eternal and persists in God even after the death of the body, he believes that the personal soul perishes with the body." 40 It remains obscure, however, how we are to understand this relationship between personal and impersonal soul. Paul Edwards, in his posthumously published God and the Philosophers, marvels at how Russell was "apparently under such a spell of Spinoza that he reports this view without one word of dissent." 41 Spinoza seems to assume that, merely by thinking of eternity, the psyche is somehow actually united with eternity 42 and thus partakes of eternity itself. The love that accompanies this mode of conception is eternal as well. 43 His contention that the mind is subject to passive emotions only as long as the body survives 44 really only makes sense if the mind is capable of living apart from the body.
Why Spinoza would equate a mind conceiving something "under a form" of eternity with a mind beingz eternal is beyond the present writer's comprehension. It was consoling to read Frederick Copleston saying "it is not easy to understand precisely what he meant by this." 45 The Spinoza that is a pseudo-St. Anselm may well have intended to pacify would-be critics rather than to elucidate truth. This hypothesis has the merit, at least, of accounting for Spinoza's repeated use of gratuitously Scholastic or anthropomorphic terms in his metaphysics. Spinoza expressly cites as one of the reasons for writing the Theological-Political Treatisez "[t]he opinion of me held by the common people, who constantly accuse me of atheism. I am driven to avert this accusation … as far as I can." 46 from the Opera Posthuma of Spinoza "personal matters" and "letters of a personal nature" (Morgan, in Spinoza, Complete Works, p. 755).
In a supplementary note to the Theological-Political Treatise, Spinoza makes the argument that the Old Testament's books of Chronicles were written after Judas Maccabee's restoration of the temple. Spinoza then says: "… I have preferred to keep silent on these matters for reasons which our own diUcult times do not allow me to explain. A word to the wise is enough" (Theological-Political Treatise, Note 21, p. 578).
Also, in July of 1675, Spinoza had planned to publish his Ethics but refrained from so doing upon "[h]aving gathered…from certain trustworthy men … that the theologians were everywhere plotting against me, I decided to postpone the publication …" (Letter 68z).
One Russell disliked the religious aspects of Spinoza's metaphysics. Unsurprisingly, Russell found Spinoza's metaphysic "completely wrong from beginning to end". 47 Since the superiority of Spinoza over Locke does not follow in the areas of either theory of knowledge or metaphysics, it is axiology, or value theory, to which we next turn.
iv. ethics
According to Locke, moral truths are closer to being completely demonstrable than is generally appreciated. 48 He contends that moral truths can be established with as much certainty as those of mathematics. 49 Spinoza's views on metaethics are more complicated: he believes "good" and "bad" to be only relative terms. 50 This certainly has emotivist implications. On the other hand, instead of seeing the cosmic order as morally neutral or indiTerent, Spinoza becomes neo-Platonic, and corre-51 While the value of Locke's political thinking is well known, the merits of Spinoza's politics have gone largely uncelebrated. Spinoza sees democracy as most nearly approximating the "natural" state (Theological-Political Treatise, Chap. 20, p. 571). The libertarian in him comes out in his opposition to sumptuary laws (Political Treatise, Chap. 10, Section 5), and his overall restriction of the law's role to aTairs of action rather than any aTairs of thought (Theological-Political Treatise, Chap. 20, p. 572. See also Chap. 18, p. 555). His view, generally, is that "He who seeks to regulate everything by law will aggravate vices rather than correct them. What cannot be prohibited must necessarily be allowed, even if harm often ensues…. Much more, then, should we allow freedom of judgment, which is assuredly a virtue, and cannot be suppressed" (ibid., p. 569. See also p. 567).
Spinoza maintains that attempts at legally resolving religious controversies angers people instead of reforming them (ibid., p. 571). He is of the view that the only religion the state ought to recognize is philanthropy and fair dealing (ibid., p. 572. See also Chap. 18, p. 555). And Spinoza cites Amsterdam as a city credited both from within and without for having had these insights (ibid., p. 571).
52 Ethics, Part v, Prop. 6. See also Prop. 3. Spinoza also speaks of how "We are passive insofar as we are a part of Nature which cannot be conceived independently of other parts" (Ethics, Part iv, Prop. 2).
lates degrees of goodness with degrees of reality. Russell himself cites the disparity between Spinoza's words concerning good and evil and his "emotional attitude" (ML, p. 11).
Accordingly, if we are to Wnd the source of Russell's preference for Spinoza over Locke, it is Spinoza's normative ethics to which we must turn. Russell approved of both Locke and Spinoza's politics 51 but is especially interested in and appreciative of Spinoza's ethics (whereas he must have looked on the philosophy of Locke as comparatively jejune and barren in this respect).
In Emotions are damaging only to the degree that they obstruct thought.
53
However, an emotion cannot be restrained or eliminated unless there is present a stronger opposite emotion to counter the Wrst emotion. 54 So the desire to think should be the strongest emotion in order that it can check competing, or opposing, emotions. Emotions that have their source in reason are, in the long term, more potent than emotions grounded on more temporary, or transient, matters.
55
Spinoza goes on to explain that the mind's understanding is its absolute virtue. Understanding Godz as equal to "Nature", 56 Spinoza celebrates God as "the highest thing the mind can understand". The "intellectual love of God" constitutes the intellect's perfection and is of the utmost importance and the greatest source of happiness.
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According to Spinoza, He who rightly knows that all things follow from the necessity of the divine nature and happen in accordance with the eternal laws and rules of Nature will surely Wnd nothing deserving of hatred, derision, or contempt nor will he pity anyone. Rather, as far as the virtue of man extends, he will endeavor to do well, as the saying goes, and be glad. Russell describes Spinoza as not only among the wisest of men but one who lived accordingly (NHCW, p. 189). Russell's own world-view can certainly feature sunny reXections such as the great value of life and the attainability of true happiness. Yet, in contrast to Spinoza, Russell's outlook does not always abound in the most uplifting considerations. After all, Russell's philosophy is one in which the great achievements of the human race and the cosmos are as a whole bound to be obliterated. 58 "A Free Man's Worship", WINC 2 , p. 107; Papers 12: 67. 59 Lest anyone be left with the impression that Spinoza was much more mystical than Russell depicts him, it is well to bear in mind Copleston's point that:
The third level of knowledge is called by Spinoza intuitive knowledge (scientia intuitivaz). But it is important to realize that it arises from the second kind of knowledge and that it is not a disconnected stage reached by a leap or by a mystical process". [Copleston 4: 235-6] "[O]ne must not let oneself be misled by the use of phrases such as 'the intellectual love of God' into interpreting Spinoza as though he were a religious mystic like Eckhart. Indeed, in interpreting Spinoza it is essential to remember that terms and phrases must be understood in the sense of his deWnitions and not in the sense which they bear in 'ordinary language'. In Spinoza's philosophy terms are given a technical sense, and this is often diTerent from the meaning which we would naturally and spontaneously attach to them. The notion that the philosophy of Spinoza was a philosophy of religious mysticism arises only if one persists in neglecting his deWnition of terms like 'God' and 'love' and the light shed on those deWnitions by the system as a whole.
(Copleston, 4: 263) "
[O]nly on the Wrm foundation of unyielding despair … can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." 58 Such wistful reXections are notably absent from Spinoza's world-view.
Unsurprisingly, philosophic calm follows more directly from Spinoza's views than from Russell's. Still, a substantial amount of Spinoza's outlook can be assimilated into Russell's. Blackwell acknowledges: "It is clear that philosophic calm is more easily produced under the view Russell attributes to Spinoza than under Russell's own doctrine, which is well known to be one of materialistic pessimism" (p. 119). "Fortunately, however, Spinoza's concept of God as a non-personal being that is not fundamentally distinct from the world is something that Russell can appreciate without committing himself to a theology and a metaphysic inconsistent with his own" (p. 112).
As Russell would have it, the key of wisdom is what Spinoza characterizes as the intellectual love of God, namely, the "happy contemplation of what is eternal" (PSR, p. 245). Blackwell traces Russell's concept of "self-enlargement through impersonality" speciWcally to his appreciation of Spinoza's Ethics (p. 109).
Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" has more in common than some may think with Russell's brand of "mysticism". Spinoza's "intellectual love of God" can be properly deemed "mystical" as Russell understood the term. 59 For, "… mysticism expresses an emotion, not a fact; it does not assert anything, and therefore can be neither conWrmed nor contra-and is better known for, profoundly more philosophic ponderings. For Russell's approach is one according to which thought ought to gaze fearlessly into the pit of hell (PSR, p. 165). We ought to be resigned to uncertainty concerning life's largest questions, for fear we be guilty of falling back on "comforting fairy tales" (HWP, p. xiv). A reXection in this mood that is vintage Russell is about how There is something feeble, and a little contemptible, about a man who cannot face the perils of life without the help of comfortable myths. Almost inevitably some part of him is aware that they are myths and that he believes them only because they are comforting. But he dare not face this thought, and he therefore cannot carry his own reXections to any logical conclusion. Moreover, since he is aware, however dimly, that his opinions are not rational, he becomes furious when they are disputed. He therefore adopts persecution, censorship, and a narrowly cramping education as essentials of statecraft.
(Human Society in Ethics and Politics, p. 219)
v. conclusion
Russell's reasons for considering Spinoza a better philosopher than Locke do not lie in considerations of either epistemology or metaphysics. Rather, it is in ethics where Russell felt we are to seek Spinoza's superiority. It is as though Spinoza's counsel for the sublimity of the mood, or aesthetic context, with which we ought to view the world as a whole passes for philosophy here. By maintaining that Spinoza was a better philosopher than Locke, Russell disregards his own earlier diTerentiation between attitudes towards lifez and creeds about the world, the latter being philosophy's proper domain. Russellian philosophy does not gauge the truth of beliefs according to "the degree of poetic emotion aroused". Except for the analysis of the ethical proposition as such, Russell does not see ethics as part of philosophy. Consequently, it would have been more appropriate for Russell to have said in his History of Western Philosophyz that Spinoza arouses more poetic emotion than Locke rather than that Spinoza was the better philosopher.
